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Managerial influences in the criminal justice system have become increasingly dominant over 
recent years. There has also been a drift towards summary justice, with the police formally 
dealing with a significant proportion of cases out-of-court. In this study of four large police 
stations, performance targets were seen to influence policing strategies and decision-making. 
Even when performance targets have changed or been eliminated, they can have an enduring 
effect on relationships and decisions made in police custody. For example, when under 
pressure to prioritise police performance targets, this encouraged senior officers to intervene 
in custody decisions, which legislation requires to be made by impartial and independent 
custody officers. An unintended consequence of performance management, therefore, is the 
potential to undermine the legal protections of those held in police custody. 
Introduction  
The Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 is intended to provide legal protections 
for those arrested and detained by the police. However, the legislation has been periodically 
revised and there have been changes within the organisations and groups which operate 
within the PACE framework.1 In addition, while PACE is intended to regulate police 
behaviour, managerial influences have become increasingly dominant, including performance 
management and the setting of performance targets. There has also been a drift towards 
summary justice, with the police formally dealing with a significant proportion of offences 
out-of-court. As Jackson (2008) observed, PACE now operates in a custodial environment 
which is no longer merely the site of the investigation, but also of accusation and 
disposition.2  
In this study of four large police stations, conducted in late 2010, the intention was to 
examine the take-up of legal advice and to identify potential barriers to legal advice.3 It was 
not anticipated at that time that the "offences brought to justice" (OBTJ) performance target 
would be relevant, particularly as it had been withdrawn some months earlier. However, it 
soon became apparent from comments made by custody sergeants that the police continued to 
be under pressure from this target. It was assumed that there had been a delayed effect 
following withdrawal of the target, influencing changes on the ground. In a subsequent study 
of one of the police stations involved, however, it was noted how a local OBTJ target was 
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continuing to influence police practices. This included the police targeting minor offences 
and other "easy hits" as a way of improving the detection rate. In addition, with priority being 
given by senior officers to achieving performance targets, they were also seen to influence 
custody officers’ decisions. 
This article draws mainly on research interviews with custody sergeants based in the four 
large police stations. It examines some of the factors associated with performance 
management which were found to undermine suspects’ legal rights when brought into police 
custody. By way of background, it is helpful to first of all consider some of the relevant 
issues arising out of performance management. 
Police performance and the OBTJ target — 2002–2010  
The "offences brought to justice" target had been introduced by Government in 2002 
following criticisms of the police for having a low detection rate for recorded crimes.4 With a 
police target to increase the number of detections, this was seen to be an effective way of 
bringing more offences to justice.5 Within a performance culture, by 2008 the set targets were 
not only met but exceeded.6 By this time, however, concerns were raised over the target 
encouraging the police to focus their attention on minor offences and other "easy hits".7  
The OBTJ target was seen to have a "net-widening" effect as the police were encouraged to 
respond formally to minor and trivial offences which would previously have been dealt with 
informally, or had no action taken in response to them.8 This led to a sharp increase in the 
number of out-of-court disposals, rising by 135 per cent from 2003 to 2008, while the number 
of convictions at court remained stable.9 The effect of the OBTJ target was to bring about a 
fundamental shift in how justice was delivered. Instead of around a quarter (23 per cent) of 
all offenders being dealt with out-of-court in 2003, this increased to 40 per cent in 2008.10  
In response to such concerns, the government revised the OBTJ target in 2007 in order to 
encourage the police to concentrate their efforts on relatively serious violent, sexual and 
acquisitive offences. While the revised target had the desired effect of reducing the number of 
out-of-court disposals, the police continued to concentrate their efforts disproportionately on 
minor offences. In June 2010, the incoming coalition government withdrew the OBTJ target. 
Police performance: reducing crime  
At the same time as abolishing the OBTJ and other police performance targets in 2010, the 
Government imposed a single "top down" target to reduce crime. The Home Secretary 
announced this change at a meeting of senior police officers. She is reported as saying that 
targets, "hinder the fight against crime" and that instead the police role was simply to "cut 
crime".11 At around the same time that the targets were changed the government announced 
substantial cuts to police budgets and so, not surprisingly, the number of individuals 
proceeded against formally, both in and out-of-court, was to decline.12 Nevertheless, as senior 
officers were only too well aware, the police would continue to be judged on the "clear up" 
rate of recorded crime, i.e. the number of detected offences. Accordingly, it seems from this 
study that while the national OBTJ target had been withdrawn, and with a single overall 
target to reduce crime, a number of police force areas went on to adopt a local target to 
increase the number of detected offences. 
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Performance targets and "gaming" techniques  
Research into public management and the use of performance measurement in other public 
sectors has shown that "what’s measured is what matters", which can encourage "gaming" 
practices in order to meet the set targets.13 In the health sector, for example, there is evidence 
of "gaming" and the creation of perverse incentives and behaviours which were stimulated by 
target-based performance management. This could be seen through skewed activity, such as 
data manipulation and deliberately delaying medical treatment.14  
The police service has been criticised for "gaming" the recorded crime statistics in order to be 
successful within a performance regime.15 With the police having responsibility for managing 
the recorded crime data, they also have discretion to "create" or "hide" offences, depending 
on the desired outcome.16 When under pressure from the OBTJ target, for example, this was 
seen to encourage the police to "create" offences, by taking formal action in cases which 
would previously have received an informal intervention, or had no action taken at all. A rise 
in the number of detected offences could then be used to show that the police were proactive 
in tackling crime. On the other hand, when under pressure to reduce crime, the police can 
"hide" offences by simply not recording details of crimes coming to their attention. 
In order to help standardise crime recording practices across police force areas, the National 
Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced in 2002. This standard was seen to have a 
positive effect, as it was prescriptive about the manner of dealing with incidents reported to 
the police.17 With the police under pressure from the OBTJ targets, however, this was noted 
to have encouraged the resurrection of "questionable" crime recording practices.18  
Performance targets and a "command and control" style of management  
Within a performance framework, a "command and control" style of management is required 
in order to ensure a commitment from the "top-down" to achieving the set targets.19 Such an 
approach is well-suited to the police as a hierarchical and disciplined organisation. Through 
performance related pay there are also financial incentives for managers to perform well 
under the set targets. Contrariwise, those managers considered to be responsible for failing to 
meet the set targets can be punished, which can include dismissal.20 If a police force was 
found to be "failing" because the targets were not met, there was also the threat of 
intervention from government. There was one police force area where the Home Secretary 
warned the Chief Constable and his senior officers that their jobs were at risk unless there 
was improvement in performance.21  
With senior officers experiencing such pressure under a performance regime, it is not 
surprising that this then led to some police force areas prioritising the set targets. Within 
police custody, however, there are PACE protections, which require certain decisions to be 
made by custody officers who are impartial and independent of the police investigation.22 It is 
important to examine further, therefore, to what extent this "top-down" approach to 
management can influence changing relationships between senior officers and "independent" 
custody officers. 
The findings in this article are drawn from the perspective of custody sergeants. The first 
issue explored is the potential "net-widening" effect of the OBTJ target, which custody 
sergeants said encouraged the police to focus their attention on minor offences and other 
"easy hits". This is followed by an examination of comments made about police cautioning 
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practices in the context of the OBTJ target. The third issue raised involves the potential for 
"gaming" by the police, through manipulation of the criminal statistics in order to achieve the 
set targets. Finally, it is the "command and control" style of management, required under a 
performance framework, which is explored in the context of decisions made in police 
custody. In particular, with senior managers responsible for achieving the set targets, there 
were concerns raised by custody sergeants about senior officers seeking to influence what 
were legally considered to be their custody decisions, which could undermine the legal rights 
of those detained. 
Methods  
This study involved an examination of the main police station in four different police force 
areas in late 2010. It included observation of suspects being booked into police custody, 
interviews with fifty custody sergeants and analysis of police custody records.23 It was arising 
out of this study that one of the four stations—Police Station B—was identified with a 
relatively low take-up of legal advice. The finding prompted the police and the defence in this 
station to support new arrangements intended to help improve access to legal advice; referred 
to as the "Bridewell study".24  
In an ideal world, the findings arising out of this study of four stations would have been 
published before the commencement of the new initiative, but this was not possible.25 
Accordingly, and by way of an update, reference is sometimes made to findings arising out of 
the Bridewell study.26 The methods in that study included observations of police custody and 
the police investigation, as well as interviews with suspects, custody sergeants, police 
investigators and defence practitioners.27  
"Offences brought to justice": widening the net of social control  
The metaphor of "net-widening" is useful when examining the OBTJ target, as this target 
encouraged the police to take formal action in relation to minor offences and other "easy 
hits". Despite the target having been withdrawn some months prior to these research 
interviews, custody sergeants in all four police stations complained about policing strategies 
which were continuing to pick on children and young people in order to help increase the 
number of detections. In relation to children, for example, one custody sergeant said, "You 
get a fight in a school playground — a nothing job. In the old days we would have taken them 
home and interviewed them in front of their parents but now they are brought into custody" 
(B:PI).28 In a similar vein, another respondent was critical of officers for bringing children 
into custody for "a kid-on-kid fight in a school playground" (A:JL). There were also concerns 
raised over the police responding formally to complaints made inappropriately by staff in 
children’s homes. As one respondent put it:  
"We are getting kids who are only 12 or 13 for minor assaults and criminal damage. They 
might have thrown a cup or something like that. The home should be geared up to deal with 
incidents like that and not involve the police"(C:PI). 
There were also examples given by custody sergeants of where the police would pick on 
students as "easy hits" for behaviour which would otherwise be ignored, or dealt with 
informally. The following three comments help to highlight some of the stratagems adopted:  
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"We have officers based in a nightclub so they can catch those under-aged who are trying to 
get in. They picked up a 17-year-old for having a fake ID [identity card] and bailed him back 
to the police station. What for? I don’t get it. The police want a detection so they will put 
resources into that sort of thing. It’s wrong."(A:ES) 
"It’s not fair when you get students away from home for the first time. They go out and have 
a bit to drink. They might be loud and swear at an officer. In the past they would have got a 
warning and been sent home but now they get arrested because it helps with the figures. It’s 
wrong, as you can have a law student getting a caution and it can affect their lives."(B:PI) 
"Every night the Governor is sending a pair of officers up to the university in order to turn 
over students for using cannabis. They get a caution and a criminal record and they will 
probably find that this then comes up on a CRB [criminal records bureau] check when they 
are looking for a job."(D:SD) 
Custody sergeants were critical of other police officers for failing to use their discretion when 
responding to minor incidents. After making the above comment, for instance, the respondent 
continued saying:   
"We used to have discretion but it’s gone now. If I found a small amount of drugs on 
someone it didn’t mean they’d be arrested. It’s nobody’s business the amount of cannabis 
I’ve chucked down the drains"(D:SD).29  
The net-widening effect of the OBTJ target was commented on by a number of custody 
sergeants. One respondent said, for example:  
"The problem is the pressure they [the police] are under. I’m not joking — it’s leading to the 
criminalisation of a section of society who should never have a criminal record"(A:ES). 
Another said, "We are criminalising a lot of youngsters who should be sorted out another 
way" (C:BQ). There were some custody sergeants, particularly the more experienced officers, 
who said that they would seek to challenge the police when bringing people inappropriately 
into custody. As one custody sergeant put it:  
"There are a lot now where we won’t authorise a detention because we think it’s a load of 
rubbish. Like schoolboy fall-outs, minor assaults and shop thefts. They are under pressure to 
get detections and picking on school kids is easy"(B:QT). 
In practice, however, custody sergeants were rarely seen to challenge the police when 
bringing suspects into custody, even though it was their responsibility under PACE to 
authorise the detention of suspects. 
When it was pointed out to custody sergeants during the research interviews that the OBTJ 
target had been withdrawn most were surprised that this was the case. Indeed, having referred 
to such pressure as being a "major problem", when told that there was no longer a national 
target, one custody sergeant replied: "If it’s gone you wouldn’t know it here because nothing 
has changed" (A:ES). It seems that "nothing had changed" in three out of the four police 
force areas because a target to increase the number of detections had been included in local 
policing plans for 2010/2011. In Police Station D, on the other hand, a couple of custody 
sergeants commented on a recent change in policing priorities. As one custody sergeant 
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explained: "Performance here is no longer all about arrests and detections. It’s more about 
victim satisfaction" (D.SE). 30  
With concerns raised over the way in which the OBTJ target encouraged the police to 
concentrate their efforts on minor offences and other "easy hits", it is interesting that a 
number of police force areas have adopted OBTJ-type targets as a local performance 
measurement. Indeed, this was despite strong criticism coming from senior police officers 
nationally, who felt the OBTJ target was undermining police discretion when responding to 
minor incidents.31 This was also an issue raised by Sir Ronnie Flanagan in his Review of 
Policing. In particular, he stated that:   
"My research has consistently highlighted examples where the service could improve its 
professional judgement and adopt a more proportionate response in responding to lower level 
crimes. The consequence of poor professional judgement, combined with existing 
performance management arrangements, is that officers are encouraged to criminalise people 
for behaviour which may have caused offence but the underlying behaviour would be better 
dealt with in a different way." 32  
While a substantial proportion of out-of-court disposals were penalties imposed by the police 
on the streets, increasingly the police were encouraged to bring more minor and trivial 
offences into custody. There were three main reasons for this change. First, there were 
incentives within a performance culture for the police to make arrests as well as to increase 
the number of detections.33 Secondly, the police were encouraged to convey a suspect into 
custody so that their identity could be checked through the routine taking of fingerprints and 
DNA samples.34 Thirdly, there had been a change in police powers of arrest, which meant 
that, "the police will be able to arrest anyone without warrant for anything, whether trivial or 
serious".35  
The intention of Government in withdrawing the OBTJ target and replacing it with another 
was to encourage the police to concentrate their efforts on reducing crime. By the first phase 
of the Bridewell study (February–May 2011), however, there was seen to be little change as 
the police continued to arrest and detain suspects for minor and trivial offences. Indeed, a key 
finding at that time was that custody continued to be used inappropriately for low-level 
offences, which included children and the elderly being detained for a minor first offence.36 It 
seems that by the time of the second phase (July–October 2012) there had been a change in 
police practices because the number of suspects detained had reduced significantly.37  
While in mid-2012 there had been a reduction in the number of suspects brought into custody 
in the Bridewell, the police would continue to detain suspects for minor offences. When 
interviewing police investigators in October 2012, for example, they acknowledged the trivial 
nature of some of the cases referred to them by front-line officers.38 Despite the minor nature 
of some of the offences involved, not one of the investigators said they would refuse to 
accept a case. On the contrary, one police investigator said: "Drivel is our thing and nothing 
can be too minor. If it is really minor then we can always use RJ [restorative justice]." 
Another police investigator said:  
"There’s no end of stuff which I think is far too trivial to be dealt with … I should say about a 
third to a quarter of cases we shouldn’t even be bothering with. We wouldn’t have dealt with 
them ten years ago." 39  
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In Choongh’s ethnographic study of police custody in the late 1990s, he noted that a 
significant minority of people were brought into custody for minor offences, particularly 
offences of disorder, where the police had no intention of invoking the criminal process.40 It 
seems that a change brought about by the OBTJ target has been to put the police under 
pressure to invoke the criminal process in relation to minor offences in order to increase the 
number of detections.41 While the OBTJ target had been withdrawn by June 2010, the police 
were still seen to be under such pressure in September 2012. In a discussion observed 
between two officers in the Bridewell study, for example, a police investigator asked a front-
line officer how his policing priorities had changed now that he was no longer under pressure 
to increase the number of detections. The officer replied:  
"You must be joking. That’s the biggest load of rubbish I have ever heard. I had a meeting 
with my Chief Inspector and all he was banging on about was detections, detections, 
detections." 42  
From recent comments made by government ministers to senior police officers, it is evident 
that the OBTJ target is not just a local problem in these three police force areas. On the 
contrary, it seems that other police forces have adopted a local performance target to 
encourage the police to increase the number of detections. Accordingly, at the Association of 
Chief Police Officer’s annual conference (in September 2013) the Minister for Policing and 
Justice urged the police to use more judgment and discretion when dealing with low-level 
crime. He also reminded senior officers that it might be appropriate to simply give someone a 
"telling off" when called to a relatively minor incident.43 In a similar vein, at the 
Superintendents’ Association’s Annual Conference (also in September 2013) the Home 
Secretary chastised senior officers for having  
"brought back ‘mechanical processes for assessing performance’ in the hope that they could 
‘simply tick boxes’ in order to prove that [they were] doing the right thing".44  
There are not only resource implications for the police when pursuing such a strategy but, as 
noted above, it can lead to people being criminalised unnecessarily.  
Performance targets and police cautioning practices  
The main criminal sanction for suspects arrested and detained by the police in the four 
stations observed was a police caution - accounting for 85 per cent of out-of-court disposals 
imposed in police custody.45 The recording of a police caution is intended as an alternative to 
prosecution and, as such, it contains many of the characteristics of a conviction. This includes 
cautions being recorded on the Police National Computer and the person is more likely to be 
prosecuted if he or she commits a subsequent offence. A caution can also be cited in a CRB 
(criminal records bureau) check, which can have consequences for an individual’s 
employment prospects. In addition, if cautioned for a sexual offence, the offender’s details 
can be noted on the sex offenders’ register. Accordingly, there are legal criteria which have to 
be met before a caution can be imposed. These include: (i) the need for a clear and reliable 
admission; (ii) that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction; 
and, if so, (iii) it has to be considered in the public interest to impose a caution as an 
alternative to prosecution.46 With the police under pressure from the OBTJ target, there were 
concerns raised by custody sergeants over cautions being imposed in cases where the legal 
criteria had not been met. When considering the "net-widening" effect of the target above, for 
example, it was mainly in relation to minor and trivial offences that custody sergeants 
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complained cautions were imposed when it was not in the public interest to do so. In this 
section it is the criterion of having sufficient evidence to gain a realistic possibility of 
conviction which is examined. 
A controversial question put to custody sergeants in the research interview was whether the 
police would sometimes impose a caution in cases where there was insufficient evidence to 
prosecute. This was controversial because most custody sergeants knew that having sufficient 
evidence to prosecute was a legal requirement, and also because they were often responsible 
for deciding whether a suspect should be cautioned.47 It is unlikely, therefore, that all custody 
sergeants would have been candid in their response but, even so, there were 20 respondents, 5 
in each police station, who said this was the case. When accepting that cautions were 
sometimes imposed inappropriately, a few respondents acknowledged the detrimental effect 
that this could have on individuals. As one custody sergeant put it:  
"A caution can impact on someone’s career. When the police come to me for a caution but 
the evidence isn’t there, I turn them away and won’t let them proceed". However, this 
custody sergeant was later to comment on the utility of imposing cautions when dealing with 
a high volume of cases. At the start of the day, for example, he said, "If we have 30 people in 
the cells in the morning then a caution can be a quick way of turning them out"(A:ES). 
There were concerns raised by custody sergeants about police officers issuing cautions 
without being aware of the cautioning criteria. This was the comment from one custody 
sergeant:   
"I know some people will caution without any evidence but I’m absolutely against that. 
Officers seem to think that if there isn’t a complaint and they can’t go to court then they can 
deal with it by way of caution. They don’t seem to realise that it’s the same test whether it’s a 
caution or a prosecution."(B:IH) 
Another custody sergeant, having commented that cautions were not recorded 
inappropriately, later on in the research interview said: "The police will use cautions when 
there’s not enough evidence to take it to court, as a way of getting detections" (A:UT).48  
It was in relation to domestic violence cases that custody sergeants said cautions were most 
often used without meeting the legal criteria. When asked about cautioning practices, for 
example, this was the response of one custody sergeant:  
"We are cautioning people inappropriately, particularly for domestic incidents because we 
have to show that we’re taking positive action. That’s rightly so, but sometimes I think we 
shouldn’t be cautioning them because we can’t offer any evidence if it went to court, because 
there isn’t any"(C:PI). 
Similarly, when a custody sergeant in another police station was asked whether cautions were 
sometimes imposed because there was insufficient evidence to prosecute he replied:  
"Yes, but we are wrong … Sometimes, particularly for violent offences and domestics, we 
would go for a caution even when it would not meet the CPS requirements. The police need 
to be seen to take positive action rather than accept that the evidence isn’t there. If they admit 
it but we haven’t got a statement [from the complainant] then it isn’t going to court and so we 
shouldn’t caution. But we have pressure from senior ranks who want us to caution."(B:SC) 
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While the CPS can consider a charging decision in domestic violence cases where a 
complainant refuses to make a statement to the police, comments from custody sergeants 
suggests that this was unlikely to be the case.49 Accordingly, the view taken by these custody 
sergeants was that if there was insufficient evidence for the CPS to consider a charging 
decision, then it was inappropriate for the police to impose a caution instead. 
With concerns raised over police cautioning practices nationally, particularly with cautions 
being imposed for serious offences, a review was undertaken by the police. Subsequently, the 
Ministry of Justice announced that the police will no longer be able to caution offenders in 
relation to indictable only offences.50 The police are also restricted from imposing a caution 
in cases involving possession of an offensive weapon (including a knife), supplying Class A 
drugs and a range of sexual offences against children.51 While this change means that people 
suspected  of committing a serious offence can only be dealt with at court, in serious cases 
where there is insufficient evidence to prosecute, an alternative can be for the police to 
impose a caution for a less serious type of offence. The review, therefore, has not had the 
desired effect of increasing legal protections for suspects diverted from court and cautioned 
by the police. However, the Ministry of Justice has recently announced a new consultation on 
"out-of-court" disposals, to include the police use of cautions.52 This review could usefully 
take into account proposals for reforming police cautioning procedure, including the adoption 
of an oversight mechanism which would allow cautioning decisions to be reviewed.53  
Police performance targets and crime recording practices  
It has been noted above that the introduction of performance targets in public services 
encouraged "gaming" techniques, which include "managing" the data in order to achieve the 
set targets. There were concerns raised by custody sergeants in all four stations over the 
OBTJ target encouraging the police to "game" the official crime figures. It was generally the 
more experienced custody sergeants who were commenting on such practices. As one 
custody sergeant put it: "If I’m honest, I don’t think the police are being truthful in their 
crime recording statistics. The problem is that they massively massage the figures" (B:QT). 
In a similar vein, a respondent in another police station said: "I will say this only quietly, but 
I would question that they are fiddling the figures" (C:QT). 
In this study of police custody, it was difficult to try and gain an understanding of the various 
ways in which the police could manipulate the official crime statistics, particularly as it could 
involve a chain of decisions made by officers in different departments. Similar practices have 
been noted elsewhere, however. When commenting on the OBTJ target in the press, for 
example, a former senior police detective is reported as saying that police forces were  
"using a series of tricks to manipulate crime figures to give a false picture of their 
performance … The techniques — dubbed ‘gaming’ — are used to create the illusion that 
fewer crimes are being committed and that a bigger proportion are being solved".54  
One way of "creating" offences, which was commented on by custody sergeants in all four 
stations, was for the police to arrest people for minor "Section 5" offences of disorder,55 
instead of for being "drunk and disorderly". This was because the former offence counts as a 
"detectable" offence whereas the latter does not. The two following comments from custody 
sergeants are illustrative of such practices:  
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"One thing I’ve noticed is that we seem to be arresting a lot of offenders for Section 5 
offences now. In the past they would have been brought in for being drunk and disorderly [‘D 
and D’]. It’s the cynic in me but I think this is because a Section 5 is a sanction detection and 
‘D and D’ isn’t. It isn’t right to say that we aren’t led by the figures because we are."(B:PI)   
"The CPS charging standards make a clear distinction between a Section 5 offence and a ‘D 
and D’. It basically means that if you are drunk and do something naughty then it is a ‘D and 
D’ offence but if you are sober and behave in the same way then it’s a Section 5. We are 
getting many more Section 5 ’s now because it’s good for the crime figures — it’s so 
wrong."(D:JL) 
Another way for the police to "create" offences, according to custody sergeants, was for the 
police to take formal action in cases which would more appropriately be dealt with as a civil 
dispute rather than a criminal offence. Examples given by custody sergeants included 
disagreements between landlords and tenants, as well as over consumer issues. The following 
two comments relate to disputes over car repairs, which custody sergeants felt had been 
brought inappropriately into the criminal justice system:  
"There was one case where the owner wasn’t happy with the repairs to his car and so he 
complained to the police. The mechanic who repaired the car was arrested for fraud and 
deception. It went through to the CPS for that! I’m not joking, there was a prosecutor looking 
into whether someone who hadn’t repaired a car properly should be charged with obtaining 
money by deception."(A:ES) 
"We’ve had people calling in saying that the garage won’t give them their car back because 
they won’t pay the bill and it’s recorded as theft of a car. We feel that garages and shops use 
us as a debt recovery agency. The problem is the police are keen to arrest people and do 
everything they can to get a detection."(D:JL) 
Such practices have been referred to as "mesh-thinning", which extends the "net-widening" 
metaphor in order to illustrate how the nets of social control can be more closely woven, 
leading to fewer cases escaping formal action once reported to the police. There were similar 
issues noted by Young in his examination of the effect of the OBTJ target on street 
policing.56 In particular, he observed a significant increase in the police use of penalty notices 
for disorder for behaviour which would previously have been dealt with informally by the 
police. 
At the time of these research interviews with custody sergeants, it was noted above how the 
withdrawal of the OBTJ target had not filtered through to decisions made on the ground. 
However, in the Bridewell study, just a few months later, the new performance target was 
seen to influence changes in police behaviour and decision-making. 
The Bridewell Legal Advice Study: update  
When returning to Police Station B in February 2011 changes were noted in police crime 
recording practices. Instead of the police being encouraged to "create" offences by pursuing a 
s.5 offence, for instance, custody sergeants said they were now dealing with more "drunk and 
disorderly" offences. As one custody sergeant  put it, "We get a lot more ‘D and D’s’ now 
instead of the cops turning them into Section 5 ’s" (B2:UV).57 With "drunk and disorderly" 
offences not being counted as a recorded crime, this strategy helps to hide a lot of low-level 
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offences which were previously included. At the same time, however, it seemed that the 
police continued to be under pressure to increase the number of detections, particularly when 
dealing with more serious offences. 
There were cases involving serious offences observed where the police wanted to conduct 
further investigations and, in the meantime, bail the suspect to return to the station at a later 
date. At the time of bailing the suspect it was the practice of custody sergeants to obtain a 
"crime number" which recorded the incident as a "crime" in the official statistics. On 
occasions, arguments were seen to arise between the investigating officer and the custody 
sergeant over whether a "crime number" should be obtained, particularly in cases where the 
police were not confident that the offence would be detected. In one case observed, for 
example, a suspect had been arrested and detained over an allegation of rape. The police 
wanted to conduct further investigations before deciding whether they had sufficient evidence 
to send the case on to the CPS for a charging decision to be made. The custody sergeant was 
asked to bail the suspect without a crime number and while refusing to accept this request 
initially, it was subsequently granted following the intervention of a senior police officer.58  
The reason why custody sergeants were reluctant to bail suspects without a crime number 
was commented on in the research interviews. When referring to a similar situation, for 
example, one custody sergeant said:  
"I had a case this morning where I wanted a crime number for an assault. The victim was 
covered in blood with a head injury but he couldn’t make a statement because he needed an 
interpreter. A man was arrested at the scene and brought into custody. The police wanted to 
bail him because they needed a statement from the victim. I asked for a crime number and the 
cop said he couldn’t be sure that the victim had been assaulted. I told him that they had a guy 
in custody for eight hours suspected of having committed the assault. If they were now saying 
they weren’t sure that the victim had been assaulted then this could make the arrest and 
detention unlawful."(B2:VU) 
Another custody sergeant commented on the pressure senior officers were under from the 
media to improve the detection rate in relation to certain types of offences, which meant they 
were keen to delay allocating a crime number in some cases. By way of an explanation, he 
said:  
"We get this a lot, particularly when they’re dealing with a burglary or assaults because they 
want to be seen to reduce these types of crimes. It’s as if we are going back to the bad old 
days when we were fiddling the figures. Well, we are massaging them to the extent that we 
won’t ‘crime’ a burglary or an assault unless they are detected. That means the figures show 
there are fewer burglaries and assaults and that’s good for PR [public relations]."(B2:SC)   
While some custody sergeants were initially prepared to challenge the pressure coming from 
investigating officers to delay the allocation of a crime number, they later accepted such 
requests following interventions made by senior officers. 
The official criminal statistics, as reported by the 43 different police force areas, can be seen 
to provide a "league table" of police performance. With a national target to reduce crime all 
police forces reported a decrease in crime in the year ending March 2013, when compared to 
the previous year. With an average reduction of 7 per cent identified throughout England and 
Wales, the falls in crime reported by police force areas varied from between three to 16 per 
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cent.59 After having taken over responsibility from the Home Office for compiling the official 
criminal statistics, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) has been sceptical about the 
reductions in crime reported by some police force areas. In particular, the ONS stated that, 
"bigger falls in police-recorded crimes may be due to pressures to meet targets on crime 
reduction and detections".60  
As noted above, while the National Crime Recording Standard was to help improve 
consistency in crime recording practices, there are limits as to how far police discretion can 
be constrained. In addition, with the British Crime Survey (BCS), a household survey, now 
providing a measure of crime as reported by victims, police recorded crime figures are not the 
only source for criminal statistics. While measuring crime in a different way, the BSC found 
that crimes against households and resident adults in 2013 were reported to be down 7 per 
cent when compared to the previous year’s survey. 
On their own, therefore, as Maguire notes, the counting of offences officially recorded by the 
police is just one of a number of ways of exploring the nature and scale of crime. However, 
he continues, saying:  
"This is not to deny the continuing importance of the traditional recorded crime figures, 
especially at the level of symbolic politics: on the contrary, the salience of crime in current 
political and media discourses ensures that even a small percentage rise in one category of 
recorded offences can set off tabloid headlines and heated political debates." 61  
Within a performance culture, therefore, it is important that the official criminal statistics are 
compiled in such a way as to reflect the complex and contradictory nature of crime. 
Performance targets and a "command and control" style of management  
From comments made by custody sergeants in this study, it was evident that performance 
management was having a dominant effect on policing strategies and decisions made in 
police custody. This section explores some of the concerns raised by custody sergeants over 
performance targets causing senior officers to  become more influential in what were 
considered to be their custody decisions.62 With the withdrawal of the national OBTJ target, 
for example, when asked if the police were still under pressure to increase the number of 
detections, one custody sergeant replied:  
"Yes, ridiculously so. Officially it’s all gone, but we are in a so-called disciplined 
organisation with different hierarchies of ranks. With each rank being accountable to the one 
above, they all want to look good to their direct boss, and the number of arrests and 
detections are what they are measured on."(B:LJ) 
When considering police cautioning practices above, some custody sergeants were seen to 
comment on the pressure coming from senior officers to improve the detection rate. This was 
made explicit by one custody sergeant who said:  
"I won’t caution someone without having the evidence, but I know there is a push from above 
to do so. It comes down to performance targets and the need to get detections. If you haven’t 
got a complaint from a victim, you won’t get a conviction at court, but with an admission in 
the interview they will give them a caution. While it is not right ethically, it is good for the 
figures."(B:IX) 
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While a number of respondents commented on senior officers intervening inappropriately in 
their decisions, it was generally the more experienced custody sergeants who said they would 
sometimes challenge such interventions. The following comments help to illustrate some of 
the ways in which custody sergeants tried to maintain their independence:  
"There’s a lot of pressure from the top and not all custody sergeants will stand up to them. It 
doesn’t bother me because I will point out that the law states where it is my decision. A 
senior officer can take on the role of the custody sergeant but if they try to overrule me I’ll 
hand them the keys [to the cells] and tell them to get on with it."(A:ES) 
"The cops are under pressure to increase detections but I’m not. I don’t give two hoots 
because I’m not measured on detections. We get pressure from the senior ranks though. I’ll 
tell the inspectors that I’m here for the guy’s welfare and not to detect their crimes."(B:QT) 
"We can get pressure from the higher ranks saying you must do this or that. I’ll refer them to 
the letter of the law. In relation to bail, for instance, I will remand someone but only if I’m 
given grounds. I won’t do it without."(C:BQ) 
When working in a hierarchical organisation it can be extremely difficult for custody 
sergeants to challenge decisions required to be made by higher ranking officers. As noted 
above, while any resistance was seen to come from the more experienced custody sergeants, 
it is of concern that most said they were due to  retire soon from the police force.63 For other 
custody sergeants, particularly those with a number of years to serve in the police, there were 
concerns raised that if they challenged senior officers’ decisions this could cause difficulties 
if they were later redeployed under their supervision. While issues of bullying and 
intimidation by senior officers were discussed informally by some custody sergeants, this was 
not an issue they were prepared to comment on in the research interviews. 
In Police Station B, in late 2010, there was a dispute arising between custody sergeants and 
police investigators over what conditions should be attached to a suspects’ bail. With custody 
sergeants being legally responsible for deciding what bail conditions should be attached, 
some said they would refuse to impose conditions as required by investigating officers if 
considered to be inappropriate.64 The following two comments from custody sergeants help 
to illustrate some of the issues raised:  
"You can get an officer wanting pre-charge bail conditions and they are told they can’t have 
them because they haven’t reached the threshold test.65 They don’t understand what this 
means and say that their boss wants them to put on conditions. I’ll tell them that their boss is 
wrong, but that just builds up a conflict with the cops, which I can do without"(B:UV). 
"We are having a lot of arguments at the moment about bail conditions. We know what’s 
suitable. A curfew on night-time burglars is a good thing but they [the detectives] come up 
with ‘Mickey Mouse’ suggestions. They want to put a condition on some suspects not to 
come into the city centre at all. You also get them wanting to impose a night-time curfew on 
someone who hasn’t done anything wrong at night"(B:FX). 
When returning to Police Station B, as part of the Bridewell study in February 2011, custody 
sergeants said that they had ‘lost the battle’ over pre-charge bail conditions. As they 
explained, this was because the dispute about who was to decide on what conditions to bail 
should be imposed was considered by supervising officers. With senior officers having 
14 
 
responsibility for police investigations outranking those responsible for police custody, it was 
determined that investigating officers would choose which conditions to attach to bail. 
Custody sergeants complained that this meant they sometimes had to impose bail conditions 
which they felt were inappropriate. With legal advisers having been excluded from the 
custody suite in this station, legal challenges to such inappropriate bail conditions were 
having to be made at court.66  
While custody sergeants generally acknowledged the potential conflict arising out of 
performance management, due to the influence of senior officers, there were others, 
particularly those who were relatively new to custody, who seemed to be unaware of such 
tensions. Indeed, one custody sergeant, recently recruited into police custody, was seen to 
have a positive attitude towards performance targets when he said:  
"Police officers are always going to be measured by what they do — how many arrests and 
detections. What else can they be measured by? You can’t measure the job they do on the 
street but you can look at their record for arrests and detections. It’s good for the cops. When 
I was a cop I liked arresting people and you knew you’d got it right because it tended to be 
the same ones who kept getting picked up."(C:IQ) 
It seems from this comment that the custody sergeant’s view of performance targets was 
informed more by his former role as a patrol sergeant than it was in his role as an 
"independent" custody sergeant. When custody sergeants were asked in the research 
interviews about what training was provided, all confirmed that they received basic training 
on PACE. Some commented that this did not place a sufficient emphasis on the legal rights of 
those detained. As one custody sergeant put it:  
"We don’t get any training on legal advice. We just read their rights off the screen. We are 
given no information about the importance of legal advice"(A:ES). 
Training for custody sergeants has been found to vary across police force areas. For example, 
a former custody sergeant described such training as a "postcode lottery", with some forces 
providing excellent in-house training, while others do not.67  
Discussion  
An unexpected finding arising out of this study of legal advice in four large police stations 
was the priority given to performance management, which was to have implications for 
decisions made in police custody. The "offences brought to justice" target, for example, was 
seen to encourage "net-widening", with the police arresting and detaining suspects for minor 
and low-level offences which previously would not have led to formal police action. While 
the OBTJ target had been withdrawn in June 2010, there continued to be sub-layers of targets 
(to increase the number of arrests and detections, for example) lying beneath the overarching 
priority to "cut crime". 
This study has made it known that cautions are the main out-of-court disposal imposed by the 
police in custody, even though this disposal is intended to be used as an alternative to 
prosecution. With pressure on the police to increase the number of detections, there were 
noted to be serious consequences for suspects as cautions were being imposed in cases where 
the legal criteria had not been met. This was  just one effect of "gaming" within performance 
management. Police crime recording practices were said by custody sergeants to be another 
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way in which the official statistics could be "gamed" in order to achieve the desired effect 
within a performance culture. While ministers try to encourage senior police officers to 
loosen their grip on performance targets, at the next general election the police are only too 
well aware that the reductions in crime will be used to show the effectiveness not only of 
government but also of the new Police and Crime Commissioners.68  
It is the "command and control" style of management, required under performance 
measurement, which was seen to be most threatening to the PACE regulatory framework. In 
particular, PACE established new standards, with the new role of the "independent" custody 
officer intended to provide a clear separation between their responsibilities in custody from 
other policing roles and from the investigation.69 However, with the "top-down" approach 
required when prioritising police performance, this was seen to encourage senior officers to 
intervene in decisions made in police custody. Within the police as a hierarchical 
organisation, such intervention meant that the independent status of custody officers could be 
undermined as it was the decisions of senior officers which were to take precedence. 
While most custody sergeants said that it was unacceptable for senior officers to try and 
influence their custody decisions, they were effectively seen to be powerless to challenge 
higher-ranking officers. Instead, and in order to protect themselves from legal action arising 
out of "bad" and even unlawful decisions which senior officers might require, all custody 
sergeants could do was note on the custody record details of the officer who had required the 
decision to be made. While this might provide some protection for custody sergeants, their 
impotence undermines important legal safeguards for those held in police custody. 
Nevertheless, by noting the name of the officer making the decision, this action does suggest 
that there are accountability mechanisms, such as the threat of legal action, which could be 
strengthened in order to uphold suspects’ legal rights. The findings also highlight the need for 
improvements in training for custody sergeants, particularly in relation to PACE legal 
protections. 
An important legal safeguard provided by PACE is having access to free and independent 
legal advice. Interestingly, not one custody sergeant commented on legal advice as helping to 
promote suspects’ legal protections. It is evident that the involvement of a legal adviser can 
help to ensure that the legal rights of their clients are upheld; including refusing to accept a 
caution if the legal criteria have not been met. However, while around 45 per cent of suspects 
in custody request a solicitor, just one-third actually receive legal advice.70 In addition, in the 
past legal advisers had waited around in police custody for their client to be dealt with, their 
presence providing an important "check and balance" on police powers. Over recent years, 
however, it seems that legal advisers have become increasingly marginalised from the pre-
charge process.71 Accordingly, the problem with the  PACE framework, as noted by Cape 
and Young, is that it "relies very heavily on the police regulating themselves, a reliance that 
has become more pronounced over time".72  
Another key issue arising out of this study concerns the resource implications for the police 
in supporting a performance culture which encourages suspects to be arrested and detained 
for minor and low-level offences. In times of austerity, it seems absurd that the police are 
continuing to support a strategy which encourages officers to concentrate their efforts on 
"easy" arrests and detections. While such a strategy enables the police to manage 
performance within "league tables" of recorded crime figures, which encourages competition 
between police forces, it also means that valuable resources are taken up unnecessarily in 
police custody. 
16 
 
This article has only been able to scratch the surface of the relationship between performance 
management and PACE safeguards in custody. Nevertheless, it has helped to highlight 
examples of perverse incentives, behaviours and gaming associated with performance 
measurement, which have the potential to undermine the independence of custody officers 
and the legal protections for suspects detained by the police. It also raises questions about the 
extent to which accountability mechanisms, such as the threat of legal action against the 
police, and access to free and independent legal advice, could be strengthened in order to help 
safeguard the legal rights of those detained. 
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